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ANTHONY MICHAEL KREIS* 
In a majority of states, it remains legal to deny people housing, employment, or 
services because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. The LGBT community 
has taken great strides to push back against the harms of discrimination, 
successfully securing municipal antidiscrimination laws in a number of discrete 
(and typically liberal) cities. While an individual’s right to enjoy full, equal 
citizenship should not depend on their zip code, hard-wrought municipal protections 
are a crucial step toward achieving more robust civil rights protections. 
 
Hostile state legislators in Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee crafted laws to 
prohibit localities from protecting classes of people beyond state law with the aim to 
block LGBT civil rights ordinances. Legislators in a handful of other states have 
offered similar bills. How should courts treat neutral laws adopted by states that 
amputate municipal civil rights-making powers? This Article argues that courts 
should use political restructuring doctrine, evolving LGBT rights jurisprudence, and 
the landmark decision Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development 
Corporation, to void municipal civil rights preemption laws as constitutionally 
deficient. 
 
 * Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. Ph.D., University of Georgia 
School of Public and International Affairs, J.D., Washington and Lee, B.A., University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill. This piece evolved from lectures at the University of Notre Dame School of Law and the 
University of Illinois College of Law, where I received thoughtful feedback for which I am grateful. I also 
benefited tremendously from exchanges with Joshua Block, Jim Oleske, Eric Seagall, and Robin Fretwell 
Wilson.  
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INTRODUCTION 
After twenty-five years of failed attempts to outlaw sexual 
orientation and gender identity discrimination in Charlotte, North 
Carolina, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”) rights 
advocates at long last prevailed upon the Charlotte City Council to act.1 
On February 22, 2016, the City Council passed Ordinance 7056 banning 
discrimination against LGBT persons by operators of public 
accommodation, common carriers, and city contractors.2 The ordinance 
would take effect on April 1, 2016.3 Unfriendly intervention by state 
legislators, however, snuffed out Charlotte’s civil rights expansion. 
State legislative leaders announced a special session of the North 
Carolina General Assembly to block Charlotte’s ordinance before it 
became effective.4 On March 23, 2016, lawmakers introduced House 
Bill 2. Named the Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, House Bill 2 
(“H.B. 2”) sailed through both chambers and was approved by Governor 
Pat McCrory in less than twelve hours.5 
Despite the bill’s innocuous title, the sweeping legislation crushed 
local regulatory powers across the board and disparately targeted the 
LGBT community. The bill curtailed private rights of action under the 
state’s employment discrimination statute.6 The legislation forbade 
local governments from raising the minimum wage or expanding labor 
 
 1. Steve Harrison, Charlotte Is Again Weighing LGBT Protections, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Feb. 
2, 2016, 6:13 PM), (noting the first failed attempt to amend the Charlotte nondiscrimination 
ordinance in 1990). 
 2. Steve Harrison, Charlotte City Council Approves LGBT Protections in 7–4 Vote, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER (Feb. 22, 2016, 3:06 PM). 
 3. Charlotte, N.C., Ordinance 7056 (2016). 
 4. Jim Morrill, NC Lawmakers Heading for Special Session Wednesday to Discuss LGBT 
Ordinance, NEWS & OBSERVER (Mar. 21, 2016, 7:15 PM). 
 5. Camila Domonoske, North Carolina Passes Law Blocking Measures to Protect LGBT 
People, NPR (Mar. 24, 2016, 11:29 AM). 
 6. H.B. 2, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (N.C. 2016). 
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rights.7 Legislators rejected the right of transgender persons to use 
facilities consistent with their gender identity.8 To that end, H.B. 2 
mandated transgender individuals use public restrooms and changing 
facilities consistent with the sex listed on their birth certificates.9 
While H.B. 2 enacted North Carolina’s first statewide public 
accommodation antidiscrimination law, it simultaneously nullified local 
public accommodations and employment nondiscrimination ordinances 
inconsistent with state law.10 Because North Carolina civil rights law did 
not extend protected class status to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender persons in employment and public accommodations, cities 
were now barred from expressly doing so. After intense public backlash, 
the North Carolina General Assembly repealed most of H.B. 2, but left 
the preemption component in place with a four-year sunset provision.11 
North Carolina was not the first state to pull back local government 
power to promulgate civil rights protections. Tennessee and Arkansas 
passed similar legislation in 2011 and 2015, respectively.12 The Tar Heel 
State may not be the last to clamp down on local control and stave off 
local LGBT-inclusive nondiscrimination protections, either. Legislators 
in Montana, Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Texas, and West Virginia 
have introduced legislation of this sort.13 Unless the LGBT community 
gains sufficient political clout to stop state legislators in conservative 
states from running roughshod over progressive municipalities, LGBT 
persons will need to seek refuge in the courts to rebalance the political 
process. 
Notably, preemption of local government authority is a more 
generalizable trend that stretches beyond LGBT civil rights as 
conservative state legislators work to stymie a broad swath of 
progressive policies championed in urban pockets of their states.14 
Iowa, Ohio, and Oklahoma, for example, are among the states that 
prohibited cities from enacting minimum wages greater than the state’s 
 
 7. Id. § 2.2. 
 8. Id. §§ 1.2, 1.3. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. 
 11. Bruce Henderson & Tim Funk, Understanding the HB2 Repeal Law—What It Does and 
Doesn’t Do, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Mar. 30, 2017, 8:50 AM). 
 12. ARK. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 14-1-401–14-1-403 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 4-21-102 
(2012). 
 13. H.B. 516, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2011); H.B. 5039, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011); 
Leg. B. 912, 102nd Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2012); H.B. 2245, 53nd Leg., 2nd Sess. (Okla. 2012); S.B. 
1289, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2016); S.B. 694, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2017); S.B. 92, 85th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017); H.B. 2899, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017); S.B.6, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Tex. 2017). 
 14. See Emily Badger, Blue Cities Want to Make Their Own Rules. Red States Won’t Let Them, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2017), (describing the rising number of state preemption laws aimed at thwarting 
liberal city policies). 
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minimum wage.15 Arizona, Indiana, and Michigan are a few of the states 
that recently blocked localities from regulating plastic bags.16 In 2017, 
Texas became the latest state to ban so-called sanctuary cities, 
penalizing municipalities that refuse to cooperate with federal 
immigration enforcement.17 After St. Louis adopted an ordinance in 
2017 banning employment and housing discrimination against women 
for their reproductive healthcare decisions,18 Missouri’s governor called 
on legislators to overturn it in a special session, warning that St. Louis 
would become an “abortion sanctuary city.”19 The Missouri Legislature 
did so, overturning the St. Louis ordinance via preemption legislation.20 
As this Article later describes in greater detail, there is an 
appreciable difference between legislation targeting local economic 
regulations and legislation intended to burden a disfavored minority 
group. How should courts treat facially neutral laws adopted by states 
that amputate municipal civil rights-making and thwart LGBT equality? 
This Article argues that taken together, political restructuring cases, 
evolving LGBT rights jurisprudence, and the landmark decision in 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development 
Corporation21 offer a path to void municipal civil rights preemption 
laws as constitutionally deficient.22 
The Article proceeds in six parts. Part I reviews the form and 
function of municipalities in American law. Part II examines courts’ 
treatment of laws restructuring municipal governments to harm racial 
 
 15. H. File 295, 87th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4111.02 (2017); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 160 (West 2014). 
 16. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 11-269.16 (2016); IND. CODE § 36-1-3-8.6 (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 445.591 (2017). 
 17. S.B. 4, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017). 
 18. Saint Louis, Mo., Ordinance 70459 (Feb. 1, 2017). 
 19. Missouri Governor Calls Special Session on Abortion, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (June 7, 
2017, 2:49 PM). 
 20. H.B. 174, 99th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017):  
A political subdivision of this state is preempted from enacting, adopting, maintaining, or 
enforcing any order, ordinance, rule, regulation, policy, or other similar measure that 
prohibits, restricts, limits, controls, directs, interferes with, or otherwise adversely affects 
an alternatives to abortion agency or its officers’, agents’, employees’, or volunteers’ 
operations or speech including, but not limited to, counseling, referrals, or education of, 
advertising or information to, other communications with, clients, patients, other persons, 
or the public. 
 21. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 22. While other scholars have examined this question, some have not focused on Arlington 
Heights, written before recent decisions on same-sex marriage and political restructuring, or before 
North Carolina’s H.B. 2. See Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, The Case for LGBT Equality: 
Reviving the Political Process Doctrine and Repurposing the Dormant Commerce Clause,  
81 BROOK. L. REV. 1015 (2016); John M. A. DiPippa, Bias in Disguise: The Constitutional Problems 
of Arkansas’s Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act, 37 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 469 (2015); 
Alex Reed, Pro-Business or Anti-Gay? Disguising LGBT Animus as Economic Legislation, 9 STAN. J. 
C.R. & C.L. 153 (2013). 
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minorities, and Part III examines the relationship between those cases 
and litigation concerning LGBT discrimination. Part IV assess critiques 
that the political restructuring doctrine has lost potency in modern 
jurisprudence and argues how the doctrine should be used to strike 
down anti-LGBT municipal preemption laws. In Part V, the Article 
examines the relationship between political process theories and  
same-sex marriage cases. Finally, Part VI addresses how courts should 
tackle the issue of state preemption laws’ facial neutrality. 
I.  LOCALITIES AS CREATURES OF THE STATE 
The ability of local governments to regulate and improve the lives 
of citizens is critical. Their “chief purpose” is to act in the “interest, 
advantage and convenience of the locality and its people.”23 Municipal 
governments reduce the cost of political participation and allow 
constituencies that hold little power on the state level to wield 
considerable influence over local affairs. For these reasons, local 
lawmaking must not be treated cavalierly¾particularly with respect to 
disfavored groups. The importance of their representative function 
notwithstanding, localities remain subject to both the constraints 
imposed by state legislators and the electorate, who can reign in local 
governments they deem rogue. 
Municipalities’ important function with respect to democratic 
governance, however, is in tension with the idea that local governments 
exist for the state’s convenience. “Municipal corporations owe their 
origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from, the 
legislature. It breathes into the breath of life, without which they cannot 
exist.”24 This is a foundational principle of American law.25 Judge 
Eugene McQuillan expounded on this concept in his seminal municipal 
law treatise, noting that barring “a specific constitutional inhibition, a 
state, by its legislature, may create municipal and public 
corporations . . . [to] exercise delegated powers . . . as subordinate 
departments, auxiliaries, or convenient instrumentalities of the state for 
the purpose of local or municipal rule.”26 
 
 23. EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 2:11 (3d ed. 2010). 
 24. City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868). 
 25. See Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907):  
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient 
agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted 
to them. For the purpose of executing these powers properly and efficiently they usually 
are given the power to acquire, hold, and manage personal and real property. The number, 
nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory 
over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State. 
 26. MCQUILLIN, supra note 23, § 1:21. 
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The dual concepts that municipalities are not sovereign entities yet 
also constitute the lifeblood of a healthy democratic system can conflict. 
Because local governments are creatures of the states, states are 
generally free to enact legislation or adopt constitutional provisions to 
centralize power. States possess “extraordinarily wide latitude” to 
delegate authority and define the powers of local governments.27 
However, states cannot erect barriers to political participation when 
motivated by the desire to harm an identifiable minority group.28 
The courts have a duty to exercise judicial review to protect the 
fairness of the political process. When the mechanisms of government 
are constructed to burden an identifiable class of persons’ ability to 
participate in the democratic process, the courts have the prerogative to 
clear the channels of policymaking. 
II.  POLITICAL RESTRUCTURING AND HUNTER-SEATTLE 
In the landmark 1969 ruling Hunter v. Erickson, the Supreme 
Court embraced political restructuring theory.29 In 1964, the Akron City 
Council enacted a fair housing ordinance to “assure equal opportunity 
to all persons to live in decent housing facilities regardless of race, color, 
religion, ancestry or national origin.”30 The ordinance provided for a 
city Commission on Equal Opportunity in Housing to investigate 
housing discrimination and take action against persons violating the 
nondiscrimination law.31 After the Ordinance’s enactment, the requisite 
ten percent of voters needed to submit a question for referendum 
successfully placed a question on the ballot to overturn the  
anti-discrimination provision and amended Akron’s charter.32 Winning 
majority approval at the ballot box, the newly-amended city charter 
voided the preexisting fair housing ordinance and required popular 
approval of any future housing law: 
Any ordinance enacted by the Council of The City of Akron which 
regulates the use, sale, advertisement, transfer, listing assignment, 
lease, sublease or financing of real property of any kind or of any 
interest therein on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or 
ancestry must first be approved by a majority of the electors voting on 
the question at a regular or general election before said ordinance 
shall be effective. Any such ordinance in effect at the time of the 
 
 27. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978); see also MCQUILLIN, supra note 
23, § 1:21. 
 28. See infra Part III. 
 29. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
 30. Id. at 386. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 387. 
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adoption of this section shall cease to be effective until approved by 
the electors as provided herein.33 
The charter’s housing provision was challenged under the Equal 
Protection Clause. Ultimately, the Court rejected justifications that the 
charter amendment served a legitimate function to allow for a more 
deliberative approach to tackling housing discrimination or that it 
served some broad democratic interest. Indeed, the Hunter Court noted 
that the Constitution cannot tolerate the diminution of political power 
in the political process any more than the purposeful dilution of 
minority voting rights.34 The Court reasoned in Hunter that because the 
measure “disadvantage[d] those who would benefit from laws barring 
racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations as against those who 
would bar other discriminations or who would otherwise regulate the 
real estate market in their favor,” it could not withstand constitutional 
scrutiny.35 
In 1971, the Court declined to extend Hunter to a California 
constitutional amendment that required municipalities to put up all 
projects for low-rent housing for referendum.36 The Court determined 
that because the California Constitution burdened “any low-rent public 
housing project, not only for projects which will be occupied by a racial 
minority” there was insufficient evidence of intentional discrimination 
to invalidate the referendum requirement.37 In that vein, the majority 
pointed out that the added procedural requirement “ensures that all the 
people of a community will have a voice in a decision which may lead to 
large expenditures of local governmental funds for increased public 
services and to lower tax revenues.”38 
Twice, the Court affirmed rulings against restructuring laws that 
blocked officials from pursuing policies to remedy discriminatory 
practices in public education. In 1969, New York enacted a statute 
prohibiting state education officials and appointed school boards from 
promulgating any policy aimed to achieve racial equality and balance in 
school districts.39 The legislation responded to efforts by the New York 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, Hunter v. Erickson, 391 U.S. 963 (1968) (No. 63), 1968 WL 
112644, at *14; Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392:  
We are unimpressed with any of Akron’s justifications for its discrimination. 
Characterizing it simply as a public decision to move slowly in the delicate area of race 
relations emphasizes the impact and burden of [the charter amendment] but does not 
justify it. The amendment was unnecessary either to implement a decision to go slowly, or 
to allow the people of Akron to participate in that decision. 
 35. Id. at 391–92. 
 36. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971). 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. at 143. 
 39. Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710, 717 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d sub nom. Chropowicki v. Lee, 
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Education Commissioner to combat worsening racial segregation in the 
state’s public schools, a problem exacerbated by changing housing 
patterns and economic shifts. 
The statute’s defenders argued that the law’s intent was not to 
impede desegregation efforts or wholesale blockade policies to promote 
greater public school integration, but to guarantee that officials crafted 
racial diversification policies at the local level attuned to local 
sensitivities.40 The three-judge district court rejected the notion that the 
local deference rationale was race-neutral.41 Far from the benign 
justifications offered in support of the law, the statute was designed to 
empower local biases. The panel held, “To the extent, however, that the 
statute thus recognizes and accedes to local racial hostility, the 
existence of which has created in the past a serious obstacle to the 
elimination of de facto segregation, the purpose is clearly an 
impermissible one.”42 
In 1982, the Supreme Court struck down a Washington State law, 
adopted by initiative, barring school boards from promulgating rules 
that would mandate a student attend any school except the institution 
geographically closest to the student’s residence.43 The state law, 
Initiative 350, included a number of exceptions to the rule. Students 
could be assigned to institutions other than those most proximate to 
their homes when students required special education, when health or 
safety hazards precluded such an assignment, when natural or 
manmade obstacles stood in the way, or “the school nearest or next 
nearest to his place of residence is unfit or inadequate because of 
overcrowding, unsafe conditions or lack of physical facilities.”44 
Initiative 350’s practical impact was that school boards retained wide 
discretion in assigning students to particular schools, but walled off 
options for tackling racial disparities and segregation patterns in 
schools. 
The district court was unmoved by arguments that the Washington 
law was, in fact, race-neutral. The court found that the “adverse effects 
of racially imbalanced schools fall most heavily upon minority 
students,” and that Initiative 350 did not “permit a school board to 
assign students for the purpose of remedying De jure segregation” 
 
402 U.S. 935 (1971). 
 40. Id. (quoting Senator Norman Lent “. . . [The legislation is] absolutely necessary if this 
Legislature is ever going to put a halt to situations where a duly constituted elected board familiar 
with local conditions and sentiment is forced to implement a plan conceived in and mandated from 
Albany which, tragically, disrupts the stability and educational climate in the community.”). 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. at 720. 
 43. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 462 (1982). 
 44. Id. 
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absent a court order.45 Nor could a local community opt to innovate 
policies to encourage diverse classes and combat de facto patterns of 
discrimination under Washington law.46 Because Initiative 350 worked 
to undermine the reach of local powers to fight discrimination, it could 
not withstand scrutiny.47 
On the same day that the decision striking Initiative 350 was 
handed down, the Supreme Court upheld a California Constitution 
provision that restricted state courts’ ability to desegregate schools. In 
1963, an action was brought in state court to desegregate the Los 
Angeles Unified School District. The trial court found the school district 
was de jure segregated in contravention of the California Constitution 
and U.S. Constitution.48 The California Supreme Court affirmed the 
lower court’s decision under the state constitution, holding the state 
constitution barred de facto and de jure segregation. 
After nine years of litigation, while the trial court prepared busing 
plans to remedy the constitutional infirmity, voters ratified a state 
constitutional amendment that allowed state courts to mandate pupil 
reassignment and transportation-based remedies only when federal 
constitutional law required.49 The amendment did not, however, 
overturn state judges’ obligation to require that schools remedy de jure 
segregation. Finding no evidence of intentional discrimination, a state 
appellate court later blocked the trial court from proceeding further 
with new integration plans for Los Angeles schools. 
The new amendment was challenged under the Hunter doctrine. 
Unlike the case out of Seattle, the California provision did not 
fundamentally reorder the political structure to the disadvantage of 
racial minorities. The Court concluded that the electorate’s decision to 
limit the state judiciary’s remedial power while “preserving a greater 
right to desegregation than exists under the Federal Constitution” could 
not logically be said to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.50 A 
 
 45. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty., Wash. v. State of Wash., 473 F. Supp. 996, 1011 (W.D. 
Wash. 1979), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State of Wash., 633 F.2d 
1338 (9th Cir. 1980), aff’d sub nom. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 102 S. Ct. 
3187, 73 L. Ed. 2d 896 (1982). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 1016. 
 48. Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 527, 530 (1982). 
 49. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7:  
[N]o court of this State may impose upon the State of California or any public entity, 
board, or official any obligation or responsibility with respect to the use of pupil school 
assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to remedy a specific violation by such party 
that would also constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and (2) unless a federal court would be 
permitted under federal decisional law to impose that obligation or responsibility upon 
such party to remedy the specific violation of the Equal Protection Clause . . . . 
 50. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 542. 
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concurring opinion authored by Justice Blackmun, and joined by 
Justice Brennan, highlighted that the constitutional amendment did not 
undermine fairness within the political process. Justice Blackmun 
wrote: 
State courts do not create the rights they enforce; those rights 
originate elsewhere¾in the state legislature, in the State’s political 
subdivisions, or in the state constitution itself. When one of those 
rights is repealed, and therefore is rendered unenforceable in the 
courts, that action hardly can be said to restructure the State’s 
decisionmaking mechanism. While the California electorate may have 
made it more difficult to achieve desegregation when it enacted 
Proposition I, to my mind it did so not by working a structural change 
in the political process so much as by simply repealing the right to 
invoke a judicial busing remedy. Indeed, ruling for petitioners on a 
Hunter theory seemingly would mean that statutory  
affirmative-action or antidiscrimination programs never could be 
repealed, for a repeal of the enactment would mean that enforcement 
authority previously lodged in the state courts was being removed by 
another political entity.51 
Importantly, the types of political restructuring held 
constitutionally infirm under Hunter-Seattle are those that burden 
identifiable classes. This was dispositive in Gordon v. Lance, a 1971 
challenge to the West Virginia Constitution and statutes governing 
municipal finances.52 West Virginia law prohibited political 
subdivisions from incurring bonded indebtedness or levying tax 
increases beyond constitutionally proscribed limits without the 
approval of sixty percent of the voters in a referendum.53 The Supreme 
Court reversed the state high court’s ruling to strike the state 
constitutional and statutory supermajority requirements as violative of 
the Equal Protection Clause. The Court determined that Hunter was 
inapplicable because, unlike the Akron charter amendment, “the West 
Virginia Constitution singles out no ‘discrete and insular minority’ for 
special treatment. The three-fifths requirement applies equally to all 
bond issues for any purpose, whether for schools, sewers, or 
highways.”54 
Taken together, Hunter and its progeny stand for the proposition 
that restructuring the political process to stymie policies aimed at 
eradicating discrimination against vulnerable minority classes cannot 
meet constitutional muster. That baseline principle was later extended 
in 1996 to lesbians, gays, and bisexuals in Romer v. Evans. 
 
 51. Id. at 546–47. 
 52. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 2–3 (1971). 
 53. Id. at 3.  
 54. Id. at 5. 
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III.  SEXUAL ORIENTATION, ANIMUS, AND RESTRUCTURING 
Like Hunter, Romer arose from the electorate’s resistance to the 
expansion of local laws protecting against class-based discrimination, in 
this instance lesbians, gays, and bisexuals (“LGB”). Before 1992, a 
handful of Colorado municipalities, including the cities of Aspen, 
Boulder, and Denver, enacted ordinances banning LGB discrimination 
in housing, employment, education, public accommodations, and 
healthcare services.55 In response, Colorado voters ratified Amendment 
2 to the state constitution, prohibiting localities from adopting 
ordinances that expanded civil rights protections on the basis of 
“homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or 
relationships.”56 
Amendment 2’s ambit reached well beyond voiding municipal laws 
protecting against sexual orientation discrimination. Indeed, the 
wholesale ban on antidiscrimination protections reached into every area 
of state government¾from the legislature, to the executive branch, to 
state agencies, to political subdivisions, and to school districts.57 After 
Amendment 2’s ratification, a number of gay plaintiffs and three 
Colorado municipalities filed suit in state court.58 The plaintiffs alleged 
that Amendment 2 violated the Fourteenth Amendment and requested 
injunctive relief.59 A Colorado trial court agreed and the Colorado 
Supreme Court affirmed.60 
Along with 1960s-era voting rights cases, the Colorado Supreme 
Court grounded their analysis of Amendment 2’s constitutionality in the 
Hunter-Seattle doctrine. The court determined the anti-gay 
constitutional amendment “expressly fences out an independently 
identifiable group” in a manner similar to the measure “invalidated in 
Hunter, which singled out the class of persons” from freely using the 
channels of government on an equal basis to secure civil rights 
protections and curb invidious discrimination. “No other identifiable 
group faces such a burden,” the court noted.61 Applying strict scrutiny, 
the Colorado Supreme Court struck down Amendment 2 because it 
purposefully blocked gays, lesbians, and bisexuals from “participating 
equally in the political process.”62 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24 (1996). 
 57. Id. at 624. 
 58. Id. at 625. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1285 (Colo. 1993). 
 62. Id.  
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The Supreme Court affirmed the state courts’ judgments but 
abandoned strict scrutiny.63 The Court applied a more exacting rational 
basis review than traditionally embraced by the Court.64 Despite the 
urging of multiple parties,65 the Court also avoided the Hunter doctrine 
altogether, though the opinion mirrored the Colorado Supreme Court’s 
political process approach. In striking down the state constitutional 
amendment on equal protection grounds, the Court’s majority 
emphasized that Amendment 2 placed non-heterosexuals “by state 
decree . . . in a solitary class with respect to transactions and relations in 
both the private and governmental spheres” because it walled off from 
LGB persons “but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries 
caused by discrimination.”66 
The state justified Amendment 2 arguing that it was intended to 
protect business owners’ freedom of association and the rights of 
religious objectors to homosexuality. Colorado also proffered that there 
was an economic benefit for businesses gained by ensuring statewide 
uniformity in nondiscrimination laws in addition to a benefit of 
shielding localities from contentious fights over homosexuality.67 While 
the Romer opinion did not address the uniformity or political 
fragmentation arguments,68 the majority reasoned that the “breadth of 
the amendment is so far removed from [the associational and religious 
liberty] justifications” that it was “impossible to credit them.”69 Rather, 
 
 63. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 (Amendment 2’s “sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons 
offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it 
affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”). 
 64. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 760 (2011) (“In the 
1996 case of Romer v. Evans, the Court invalidated an antigay state constitutional 
amendment . . . depart[ing] from the usual deference associated with rational basis review. For this 
reason, commentators have correctly discerned a new rational basis with bite standard in such 
cases.”). 
 65. See Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar: Political Process Theory Through the Lens of the 
Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1363 (2011) (“Many of the briefs in the case addressed the 
Hunter theory, but that argument was explicitly set aside by the high Court without comment.”). 
 66. Romer, 517 U.S. at 627. 
 67.  
The State also benefits from creating an environment where large employers and property 
owners may operate under uniform laws, thereby providing greater economic and legal 
predictability in their affairs. Equally important is the necessity of ensuring that the deeply 
divisive issue of homosexuality does not serve to seriously fragment Colorado’s body 
politic.  
Brief for Petitioner at *47, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039), 1995 WL 310026, at *47. 
 68. The state trial court noted a discrepancy between the justifications offered by the state for 
Amendment 2 and the measure’s purpose according to Amendment 2’s architects. At trial, three 
major proponents of Amendment 2 stated the goal of the amendment was to “deny protected status 
to homosexuals and bisexuals,” . . . “fend off state-wide militant gay aggression,” and “prevent the 
government from declaring that homosexuals are entitled to protected class status.” Evans v. Romer, 
No. CIV. A. 92 CV 7223, 1993 WL 518586, at *4 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 1993). 
 69. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. 
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the impetus behind Amendment 2 was an illegitimate desire to harm 
non-heterosexuals. 
Soon after Romer, federal courts were asked to consider a 
challenge to Cincinnati’s restriction on local protections for gays, 
lesbians, and bisexuals in Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati v. 
City of Cincinnati. In 1991, the City Council enacted an ordinance 
prohibiting discrimination in municipal employment on the basis of 
“race, color, sex, handicap, religion, national or ethnic origin, age, 
sexual orientation, HIV status, Appalachian regional ancestry, and 
marital status.”70 In 1992, Cincinnati adopted an ordinance extending 
civil rights protections in public accommodations, housing, and 
employment to cover claims of sexual orientation discrimination.71 
Gay rights opponents filed a petition for a referendum to amend 
the city’s charter to invalidate the sexual orientation antidiscrimination 
provisions and bar the Cincinnati City Council from enacting any other 
protections for the LGB community.72 Anti-gay interests prevailed in 
November 1992. Like Akron’s city charter limitations for housing policy 
in 1968, any civil rights ordinance to prohibit sexual orientation 
discrimination would require a popular referendum. That similarity 
notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the 
charter revision without a substantial treatment of the Hunter decision, 
though the court’s opinion thoroughly examined Romer. 
The Sixth Circuit employed Hunter to emphasize the basic 
proposition that local policies adopted by popular referendum are 
entitled to judicial deference because they are “designed in part to 
preserve community values and character” unless those measures 
“impinge upon any fundamental right or the interests of any suspect or 
quasi-suspect class.”73 That was the extent of the opinion’s treatment of 
Hunter and the political process theory cases. 
Relying on Bowers v. Hardwick, which upheld laws criminalizing 
sodomy, the panel held that because “the conduct which define[] 
 
 70. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 292 (6th Cir. 
1997). 
 71. Id. at 292. 
 72.  
The City of Cincinnati and its various Boards and Commissions may not enact, adopt, 
enforce or administer any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy which provides that 
homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status, conduct, or relationship constitutes, 
entitles, or otherwise provides a person with the basis to have any claim of minority or 
protected status, quota preference or other preferential treatment. This provision of the 
City Charter shall in all respects be self-executing. Any ordinance, regulation, rule or 
policy enacted before this amendment is adopted that violates the foregoing prohibition 
shall be null and void and of no force or effect.  
Id. at 291. 
 73. Id. at 297. 
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homosexuals was constitutionally proscribable” and not a suspect or 
quasi-suspect class, the court was bound to accord the Cincinnati 
measure with highest degree of deference and applied rational basis 
review.74 The court applied a weak rational basis review and 
differentiated Colorado’s Amendment 2 from the Cincinnati charter. 
The opinion reasoned that Amendment 2 and the Cincinnati initiative 
were “substantially different enactments of entirely distinct scope and 
impact.”75 
Whereas Colorado’s Amendment 2 in Romer left LGB persons 
“without recourse to any state authority at any level of government for 
any type of victimization or abuse,” the Cincinnati Charter Amendment 
“merely” forbade them from “obtaining special privileges and 
preferences” in one municipal jurisdiction.76 That analysis would carry 
greater persuasion had the initiative simply reversed the city’s 
discretionary civil rights policy and not imposed an additional political 
hurdle to overcome. In the years since Equality Foundation was handed 
down, a number of lower courts in the Sixth Circuit called the decision’s 
currency into question,77 noting that it came before Lawrence v. Texas’ 
overturning Bowers in 2003.78 
Despite the panel’s flawed pre-Lawrence reasoning that failed to 
apply Hunter with any rigor, the opinion was not silent on the 
permissibility of laws on the state level to suffocate civil rights on the 
local level. In that vein, the panel proffered that while a city’s  
self-imposed limitation on sexual orientation discrimination 
protections could withstand rational basis review, a statewide blanket 
ban on local civil rights measures to shield LGB persons from invidious 
treatment would fall under Romer even when justified on economic and 




 74. Id. at 293. The court followed similar logic employed by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. 
See Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684 n. 3 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (“It would be quite anomalous, 
on its face, to declare status defined by conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as 
deserving of strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause.”). 
 75. Equal. Found., 128 F.3d at 295. 
 76. Id. at 296. 
 77. See Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 986 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (“Equality 
Foundation no longer stands as sound precedential authority for the proposition that restrictions on 
gay and lesbian individuals are subject to rational basis analysis.”) rev’d sub nom. DeBoer v. Snyder, 
772 F.3d 388, 415 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015); 
Bassett v. Snyder, 951 F. Supp. 2d 939, 961 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (emphasizing that the Equality 
Foundation reliance on Bowers makes its precedential value “worthy of reexamination”). 
 78. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, 
and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be 
and now is overruled.”). 
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A state law which prevents local voters or their representatives, against 
their will, from granting special rights to gays, cannot be rationally 
justified by cost savings and associational liberties which the majority 
of citizens in those communities do not want. Clearly, the financial 
interests and associational liberties of the citizens of the state as a whole 
are not implicated if a municipality creates special legal protections for 
homosexuals applicable only within that jurisdiction and implements 
those protections solely via local governmental apparatuses. For this 
reason, the justifications proffered by Colorado for Colorado 
Amendment 2 insufficiently supported that provision, and implied that 
no reason other than a bare desire to harm homosexuals, rather than to 
advance the individual and collective interests of the majority of 
Colorado’s citizens, motivated the state’s voters to adopt Colorado 
Amendment 2.79 
Though dicta, the Equality Foundation court recognized that the 
economic justifications a state might offer in defense of preempting 
localities from combating discrimination against sexual minorities 
merely belie anti-gay animus. The court erred in upholding the 
Cincinnati charter amendment because it was unable to project the 
trend Romer would spark while Bowers remained good law. That 
myopic application of Romer notwithstanding, the court nevertheless 
still understood¾well before Lawrence¾that the courts should reject 
economic and associational rationalizations for statewide policies that 
amputate local bodies from the rights-making process as window 
dressing. 
IV.  RETHINKING HUNTER’S “RETRENCHMENT” 
The Hunter doctrine took center stage in a 2013 challenge to the 
Michigan Constitution’s limitations on affirmative action programs. In 
2003, the Supreme Court ruled in Grutter v. Bollinger that the 
affirmative action policy at the University of Michigan’s law school 
withstood constitutional scrutiny because it took into limited 
consideration applicants’ race in a holistic fashion.80 In a companion 
case, Gratz v. Bollinger, the Court struck down the University of 
Michigan’s undergraduate admissions policy that rigidly assigned a 
numerical value to applicants if they were from an underrepresented 
racial group.81 
Soon after the pair of decisions, Michigan voters adopted a state 
constitutional amendment, Proposal 2, which prohibited state and local 
governments as well as public institutions, like public colleges and 
universities, from using any race conscious policies. The amendment 
compelled the state and its subdivisions to “not discriminate against, or 
 
 79. Equal. Found., 128 F.3d at 300. 
 80. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003). 
 81. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271, 275–76 (2003). 
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grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of 
race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public 
employment, public education, or public contracting.”82 A collection of 
organized interest groups subsequently filed suit in federal court 
challenging the constitutional provision, theorizing it violated the Equal 
Protection Clause because it rigged the architecture of policymaking to 
disadvantage racial minorities. 
Rejecting the plaintiff’s equal protection claim, the district court 
granted a motion for summary judgment by the Michigan Attorney 
General.83 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the grant of summary 
judgment.84 After granting en banc review, the Sixth Circuit again 
reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that Michigan 
Constitution’s constraints on affirmative action ran afoul of the Equal 
Protection Clause because it constituted impermissible political 
restructuring. Using the example of legacy admissions policies that 
benefit the children of alumni, the court illustrated the disparate impact 
of Proposal 2. The court said: 
An interested Michigan citizen may use any number of avenues to 
change the admissions policies on an issue outside the scope of 
Proposal 2. For instance, a citizen interested in admissions policies 
benefitting . . . sons and daughters of alumni of the university w may 
lobby the admissions committees . . . may petition higher 
administrative authorities at the university . . . may seek to affect the 
election . . . of any one of the eight board members . . . [and] may 
campaign for an amendment to the Michigan Constitution.85 
The Supreme Court, 6-2, reversed the Sixth Circuit in a series of 
opinions. The plurality opinion by Justice Kennedy defended the 
Michigan amendment as a legitimate exercise of the democratic 
process: 
Our constitutional system embraces . . . the right of citizens to debate 
so they can learn and decide and then, through the political process, 
act in concert to try to shape the course of their own times and the 
course of a nation that must strive always to make freedom ever 
greater and more secure.86 
 
 82. MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 26. 
 83. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d 924,  
957 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
 84. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. By 
Any Means Necessary (BAMN) v. Regents of Univ. of Michigan, 652 F.3d 607, 610 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 85. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. By 
Any Means Necessary v. Regents of Univ. of Michigan, 701 F.3d 466, 484 (6th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub 
nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for 
Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1645 (2014). 
 86. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for 
Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1637 (2014). 
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The lead opinion went on to explain that the political process 
remained open for voters to consider what types of “programs designed 
to increase diversity¾consistent with the Constitution¾[might be a] 
necessary part of progress to transcend the stigma of past racism.”87 
While Schutte could be understood as striking a blow to political 
process theory, the jurisprudential foundation of affirmative action 
cases disfavors painting the Court’s decision with such a broad brush. 
When the Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of 
affirmative action programs in Regents of California v. Bakke, Justice 
Lewis Powell writing for a 4-1-4 fractured court, rejected claims that 
affirmative action programs were constitutionally justifiable as a tool to 
ameliorate past discrimination. Powell wrote that a public institution of 
higher education “helping certain groups . . . perceived as victims of 
‘societal discrimination’ does not justify a classification that imposes 
disadvantages” on some in the application process “who bear no 
responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special 
admissions program are thought to have suffered.”88 
Heeding Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke, when the Supreme 
Court blessed the University of Michigan School of Law’s  
race-conscious admissions policy in 2003, the Court did so because the 
school had “a compelling interest in a diverse student body” that 
advanced the school’s “proper institutional mission.”89 Given the 
constitutionally permissible interests the state had in promulgating 
affirmative action policies under Grutter, Proposal 2 did not target 
remedial policies for past discrimination or policies that prohibit 
invidious discrimination. Rather Proposal 2, however arguably 
imprudent, ultimately shut down one method of achieving diversity in 
higher education. Michigan’s public colleges and universities remain 
free to ask¾and do ask¾for supplemental information, inviting 
applicants to express how they might contribute to the student body’s 
diversity. 
V.  MARRIAGE AND POLITICAL RESTRUCTURING 
After state courts in Hawaii and Alaska struck down state statutes 
that excluded same-sex couples from marriage rights in 1996 and 1998, 
respectively,90 both states’ constitutions were amended to foil litigation 
to expand the scope of marriage rights.91 The Hawaii amendment did 
 
 87. Id. at 1638. 
 88. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978). 
 89. Grutter v. Bolinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003). 
 90. Baehr v. Lewin, P.2d 44, 48 (Haw. 1993), as clarified on reconsideration (May 27, 1993) 
abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015); Brause v. Bureau of Vital 
Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at *1 (Ala. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998). 
 91. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (“To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only 
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not outright ban same-sex marriage. Rather it removed same-sex 
marriage claims from the courts’ purview. Thus, while same-sex 
couples’ appeals to the judiciary were dead-ended in Hawaii, they could 
continue to advocate for more inclusive family law on an equal basis 
with other family law reforms in the legislature. 
While it delayed the realization of same-sex couples’ fundamental 
rights, the Hawaii Constitution did not impose a unique burden on 
same-sex couples in the political branches. No other state followed 
Hawaii’s decision to curb the jurisdiction of state courts without 
clamping down on the political process. Indeed, every state followed the 
Alaska model, which banned same-sex relationship recognition as a 
matter of state constitutional law. Despite having ample ammunition, 
the legal attacks on state constitutional amendments banning same-sex 
marriage did not focus on political restructuring with the exception of 
an early lawsuit in Nebraska. 
Nebraska was the third state to amend its state constitution to 
block the spread of LGB family law equality in 2000. It was the first 
state to take action in the wake of the Vermont Supreme Court’s 
decision in Baker v. State,92 which resulted in Vermont adopting civil 
unions for same-sex couples. Nebraska Initiative 416 asked Nebraskans 
to ratify a constitutional provision that outright forbade affording any 
state benefits to same-sex couples.93 Seventy percent of voters approved 
it.94 
In 2003, a coalition of pro-LGB rights organizations filed suit in 
federal court against Nebraska Attorney General Jon Bruning, 
challenging Initiative 416.95 The political restructuring theory offered by 
the organizations gained some traction in 2005 when the groups 
prevailed in federal district court.96 That ruling, however, was 
overturned by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which 
determined that “the political burden erected by a constitutional 
 
between one man and one woman.”); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“The legislature shall have the power 
to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.”). 
 92. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 93. Pam Belluck, Nebraskans to Vote on Most Sweeping Ban on Gay Unions, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
21, 2000). 
 94. Robynn Tysver, Same-Sex Union Fight Is Not Over, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (May 13, 2005). 
 95. Complaint, Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005) 
(No. 4:03 cv 3155). 
 96. “Members of all groups, which include those that are controversial, have a fundamental 
right to ask for the benefits and protections from the government . . . . Section 29 goes beyond a mere 
definition of marriage. Plaintiffs are denied access to the legislative process that is afforded to all 
citizens of the State of Nebraska. As previously set forth, the Nebraska Attorney General interprets 
Section 29 to mean that any proposed legislation that would give rights to domestic partners would 
violate Section 29 . . . . Thus, Section 29 makes it more difficult for this group, a minority, to enact 
favorable legislation.” Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1003 (D. Neb. 
2005), rev’d sub nom. Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006). 
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amendment [like Nebraska’s] would find support” if sexual orientation 
were a suspect classification.97 The court rubber-stamped the 
constitutional amendment under a traditional rational basis review. 
Despite the absence of political restructuring theories in marriage 
litigation targeting state-level marriage discrimination, it was arguably 
at the heart of the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor  
v. United States.98 In Windsor, the Supreme Court invalidated the 
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), a 1996 law aimed to thwart the 
spread of same-sex marriage. DOMA had altered the Dictionary Act and 
defined “marriage” and “spouse” to exclude same-sex couples from the 
over 1,000 federal statutes and regulations that conferred benefits on 
married couples.99 Among the many federal benefits that DOMA took 
out of the reach of same-sex couples were Social Security, housing, 
taxation, copyright, and veterans’ affairs benefits.100 
The Windsor Court held that DOMA violated the equal protection 
guarantees incorporated in the Fifth Amendment because it had the 
purpose and effect of imposing inequality on married same-sex 
couples.101 The Windsor majority opinion was a hybrid of substantive 
due process, equal protection, and federalism, but it stressed the 
unusual step Congress took in 1996 to supplant state family law with an 
extraordinary federal edict: 
The responsibility of the States for the regulation of domestic 
relations is an important indicator of the substantial societal impact 
the State’s classifications have in the daily lives and customs of its 
people. DOMA’s unusual deviation from the usual tradition of 
recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage here operates 
to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities that 
come with the federal recognition of their marriages. This is strong 
evidence of a law having the purpose and effect of disapproval of that 
class.102 
Undoubtedly, Windsor is an amalgam of doctrines in an evolving 
line of dignity jurisprudence. The opinion, however, is heavily threaded 
with political restructuring undertones carried from Romer and 
reinforces the principle that dramatic shifts in standard practice raise 
red flags that call for added judicial inspection. As the next Part details, 
 
 97. Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 866 (8th Cir. 2006), abrogated by 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 98. Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 99. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012)) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, 
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, 
the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, 
and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”). 
 100. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
 101. Id. at 2693. 
 102. Id. 
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whether a law causes a substantial departure from traditional practice, 
like DOMA, is instructive for divining whether a facially neutral law was 
adopted for improper reasons. 
VI.  FACIAL NEUTRALITY AND POLITICAL BARRIERS 
The problem in challenging municipal civil rights preemption laws 
is that they are facially neutral and plaintiffs must proffer evidence that 
their nondiscriminatory justifications are merely pretext¾here, that 
statewide uniformity is simply good economic policy. Business-related 
defenses of these laws ring hollow and are disingenuous. They do not 
and should not enjoy immunity from judicial inspection. 
Laws that have a disparate impact on minority groups do not 
violate the Constitution unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the law 
has a discriminatory intent.103 While intent is easily discerned when a 
law explicitly targets a minority group like in Romer, a particular 
challenge arises when laws are facially neutral but were intended to 
have a discriminatory effect. As the Supreme Court articulated in 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, 
courts are empowered to conduct a “sensitive inquiry 
into . . . circumstantial and direct evidence of intent” to divine if a 
discriminatory motive undergirded legislative action.104 
The Arlington Heights Court delineated five lines of inquiry for 
courts to examine when inquiring into whether discriminatory interests 
impermissibly motivated a particular piece of legislation or regulation: 
(1) the historical backdrop of the controversy, (2) the events preceding 
the challenged action, (3) significant departures from standard 
procedures, (4) substantive departures from typical practice, and (5) the 
legislative or administrative history.105 An application of the Arlington 
Heights framework to state civil rights preemption laws brings into 
focus legislators’ improper, invidious motivations. 
The recent wave of municipal preemption laws cropped up in the 
wake of a national trend of expanding state statutory protections for 
LGBT persons and litigation favoring LGBT litigants. Most importantly, 
these state preemption laws were immediate and direct responses to 
local governments taking action to expand human rights ordinances to 
cover LGBT persons while their state legislators resisted the national 
trend. There is no better example of hostility toward sexual minorities 
triggering the enactment of restrictive statewide laws than North 
Carolina. First, H.B. 2 was an unmistakable response to Charlotte 
 
 103. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1978) (explaining that “impact is not irrelevant, but 
it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination.”). 
 104. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Div., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). 
 105. Id. at 267–68. 
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extending civil rights protections to LGBT persons. Second, H.B. 2 was 
enacted in a rare and hurried special session, a considerable digression 
from regular legislative procedure.106 The events leading up to similar 
legislation in Tennessee and Arkansas are, unsurprisingly, also similar. 
In Tennessee, the bill to nullify local antidiscrimination protecting 
sexual minorities was introduced less than a month after Nashville 
introduced an ordinance to achieve that very end. The LGBT-inclusive 
amendment to Nashville’s human rights law was introduced in January 
2011 and adopted in April 2011.107 The municipal preemption bill, H.B. 
600, was filed in February 2011 and signed into law in May 2011.108 
Dubbed the Equal Access to Intrastate Commerce Act, it limited 
localities to protecting classes of persons defined under state human 
rights law.109 State law did not expressly protect LGBT persons. And 
while Governor Bill Haslam offered support for the law as a  
pro-business measure, the bill’s author saw his legislation as social 
policy. The sponsor said H.B. 600 was intended to stop Nashville from 
“dictating moral policy.”110 
To disabuse observers of any notion that legislators were of 
illegitimate intent, H.B. 600 also amended Tennessee’s statute 
outlawing discrimination on the basis of creed, color, religion, sex, age 
or national origin in connection in employment and public 
accommodations, and against discrimination on the basis of race, color, 
creed, religion, sex or national origin in housing. H.B. 600 took the 
added step of defining “sex” under the state’s Human Rights Act as “the 
designation of an individual person as male or female as indicated on 
the individual’s birth certificate” in an attempt to bar claims that LGBT 
discrimination is sex discrimination under theories of sex stereotyping 
and gender nonconformity.111 
 
 106. See supra INTRODUCTION. 
 107. Nashville, Tenn., Ordinance BL2011-838 (Apr. 8, 2011). 
 108. H.B. 600, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011); Bill Information for HB 600, TENN. 
GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.captiol.tn.gov/Bills/107/Bill/HB0600.pdf; Amanda Terkel, Tennesee 
Anti-Gay Bill, Backed By State Chamber of Commerce, Puts Big Business in a Tough Spot, HUFF 
POST (May 23, 2011, updated July 23, 2011). 
 109. H.B. 600; see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-102 (2012). 
 110. Lisa Keen, Activists: Anti-gay Tennessee Law Will Be Challenged, DALLAS VOICE 23 (May 
28, 2011) https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth239169/m1/23/. 
 111. H.B. 600. A number of LGBT discrimination claims have advanced under the theory that 
sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination. See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. 
Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 340–41 (7th Cir. 2017):  
For many years, the courts of appeals of this country understood the prohibition against 
sex discrimination [under the federal Civil Rights Act] to exclude discrimination on the 
basis of a person’s sexual orientation. The Supreme Court, however, has never spoken to 
that question. In this case, we have been asked to take a fresh look at our position in light 
of developments at the Supreme Court extending over two decades. We have done so, and 
we conclude today that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex 
discrimination. 
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Arkansas’ story mirrors North Carolina’s and Tennessee’s stories. 
Before 2015, a handful of Arkansas municipalities adopted measures to 
guarantee equal citizenship in the public square for LGBT persons.112 
Arkansas’ municipal preemption law came on the heels of a failed, high-
profile, and divisive fight in Fayetteville over a measure favoring LGBT 
civil rights. On August 19, 2014, the Fayetteville City Council approved a 
civil rights ordinance to proscribe LGBT discrimination in housing, 
employment, and public accommodations.113 After a petition 
successfully placed the new ordinance up for referendum, voters 
narrowly overturned the ordinance on December 9, 2014.114 
Responding to the high profile campaign in Fayetteville and 
voicing religious opposition to LGBT-inclusive human rights 
ordinances,115 state legislators worked to foreclose the issue altogether 
with SB202.116 In fact, SB202’s sponsor wasted little time to announce 
his intentions, posting his plan to restrict localities from expanding 
LGBT rights as vote counting was underway in Fayetteville.117 Despite 
naming SB202 the “Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act” to obscure 
the municipal preemption statute as a vanilla economic regulation, 
legislators repeatedly referred to the failed Fayetteville ordinance 
throughout debates.118 Governor Asa Hutchison used debate over 
SB202 to voice opposition to LGBT civil rights laws even while he 
withheld support for the bill.119 
In each of these states, statewide laws that choked off  
rights-making at the local level were direct responses to pro-LGBT 
campaigns. That these states gave localities freedom to promulgate civil 
rights protections before state usurpation of local power constitutes a 
substantive departure from usual practice. Applying the Arlington 
 
 112. Max Brantley, Fayetteville Adopts Civil Rights Ordinance 53-47, ARK. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2015, 
8:00 PM) (listing Little Rock, Maumelle, North Little Rock, Pulaski County, Garland County and 
Eureka Springs as banning LGBT discrimination by local ordinance). 
 113. Fayetteville, Ark., Ordinance 5703 (Aug. 20, 2014) (repealed 2014). 
 114. Todd Gill, Voters Repeal Civil Rights Ordinance in Fayetteville, FAYETTEVILLE FLYER (Dec. 
9, 2014).  
 115. Updated: Bill Barring Discrimination Ordinances at City, County Level Becomes Law, 
ARK. NEWS (Feb. 24, 2015) (“Some supporters [of SB202] also have said they support the right of 
businesses to deny certain services to customers based on sexual orientation—such as baking a 
wedding cake for a same-sex couple—and that the Fayetteville ordinance would have interfered with 
that right.”). 
 116. S.B. 202, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015); Bill Status History, ARK. GEN. ASSEMB., 
http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2015/2015R/Pages/BillInformation.aspx?measureno=sb202 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2017). 
 117. See Brantley, supra note 112 (reporting on a tweet from State Sen. Bart Hester calling for a 
state preemption law as election results were tabulated). 
 118. See John M. A. DiPippa, Bias in Disguise: The Constitutional Problems of Arkansas’s 
Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act, 37 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 469, 483 (2015). 
 119. Michael R. Wickline, Senate Approves Ban on Localities’ Anti-Bias Laws, DEMOCRAT 
GAZETTE (Feb. 10, 2015, 1:00 AM).  
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Heights factors in tandem with the Hunter and its progeny of political 
restructuring cases, courts can readily sweep away the false economic 
pretenses offered to justify stamping out home rule to blockade rights 
for a disfavored community. 
CONCLUSION 
In a majority of states, it remains legal to deny people housing, 
employment, or services on the basis of their sexual orientation or 
gender identity.120 The LGBT community has taken great strides to push 
back against the harms of discrimination, successfully 
securing municipal antidiscrimination laws in discrete municipal 
jurisdictions.121 While an individual’s right to enjoy full, equal 
citizenship should not depend on their zip code,  
hard-wrought municipal protections are a crucial step toward achieving 
more robust civil rights protections. 
Hostile state legislators must not be allowed to stand athwart the 
advancement of civil rights and restructure government to harm LGBT 
persons. Just as the courts dismantled state and local laws intended to 
stifle racial antidiscrimination policies at the local level, courts must 
strike down municipal preemption laws aimed to harm the LGBT 
community, and reinvigorate the democratic process. Importantly, 
judges must not give credence to legislative window dressing crafted in 
anticipation of litigation. Courts should rule with clarity that business 
“concerns” are insufficient to deny persons the mere opportunity to 
meaningfully ask for basic civil rights protections from their local 
representatives. Indeed, it makes little sense for the Constitution to 
protect same-sex couples’ right to form intimate relationships and 
marry,122 transgender persons’ right to be free from discrimination in 
the public workplace and schools,123 and yet allow states to deny LGBT 
persons a seat at the table in municipal government. 
 
 120. Katy Steinmetz, Why so Many States Are Fighting over LGBT Rights in 2016, TIME (Mar. 
31, 2016). 
 121. Local Non-Discrimination Ordinances, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, www.lgbtmap. 
org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_ordinances (listing municipal LGBT civil rights 
protections). 
 122. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015):  
Especially against a long history of disapproval of their relationships, [the] denial to same-
sex couples of the right to marry works a grave and continuing harm. The imposition of 
this disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate them. And the 
Equal Protection Clause, like the Due Process Clause, prohibits this unjustified 
infringement of the fundamental right to marry. 
 123. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312,1321 (11th Cir. 2011) (ruling in favor of transgender 
woman’s employment discrimination claim under the Equal Protection Clause); Whitaker By 
Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1050–51 (7th Cir. 2017) 
(holding that the Equal Protection Clause protects transgender public school students from 
discrimination). 
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